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ABSTRACT 
How does the distribution of commercial satellite payloads affect the National Space 
Transportation Policy?  Looking at the launch of commercial satellite payloads as a market, 
providing profit for private ventures, the question was analyzed by linking the economic benefits 
of the market to policy that it influences.  Historical models are used to establish an economic 
variable and correlate its impact on policy change through time, using the 1994, 2004 and 2013 
National Space Transportation Policies.  The primary methods used were different comparative 
text analysis to baseline the changes of the evolving policies as applicable to a growing private 
space launch industry. Conclusions of this research indicate favorable trending for the private 
space launch industry within the three policy versions, particularly when it comes to competing 
for national security space payloads
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On 27 May 2016, the first stage of the Falcon 9v1.1 rocket, built and flown by Space 
Exploration Technologies (SpaceX), landed successfully for the third consecutive time on a 
barge in the Atlantic Ocean (Dean, 2016).  These landings represent an evolving opportunity for 
the space launch industry.  As spacelift grew to fruition from its germination in the 1950s and 
1960s era of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), to early manned space launch, the 
focus shifted from a trial-by-fire approach, to a more safety-focused, procedural architecture, 
which was appropriate given the introduction of human life.  Alternatively, while the federal 
launch ranges at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB) and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
(AFS) are now America’s main launch hubs for commercial and military payloads, they were 
initially established as missile test ranges, located in once remote locations.  As the respective 
areas grew up around the rocket industry, the need for more deliberate safety measures became 
necessary.  Given these factors, modern-day launch is centered around safety and redundancy, 
and a culture of military procedure and process was born.  The opportunity that SpaceX 
represents, as well as the rest of the private lift industry, is an environment of competition 
independent of government oversight, while still maintaining safety criteria established by the 
government.  The United States has generated renewed focus on incorporating private and 
commercial enterprise where able within the space industry.  This policy is reflected in the most 
recent National Space Policy, released in 2010 by the Obama Administration, and is 
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subsequently incorporated into the most recent National Space Transportation Policy (NSTP), 
which applies it more specifically to launch.  Regardless of the method of orbital delivery, the 
United States maintains a standard of assured access to space, the concept of maintaining the 
ability to freely traverse to and from orbit unhindered.       
Assured access to space is a primary objective of the United States space program and 
has been since space assets were recognized as integral components of modern life and, more 
importantly, national security.  Consequently, policy was developed to ensure continued access 
to space to establish and protect U.S. space assets.  The National Space Transportation Policy has 
come to govern and guide American launch activities over the past decade.  The first version, 
The National Science and Technology Council/NSTC-4 was released by the Clinton 
Administration on 5 August 1994, more commonly known as the National Space Transportation 
Policy of 1994 (Hogan & Villhard, 2003, p. 1).  This regulation came about in recognition of the 
vital role space transportation played in delivering space capability in an appropriate and timely 
manner to fulfill the requirements of the nation.  This directive established that the Department 
of Defense (DoD) would lead the charge on the expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleet of the 
time, and oversee technology development.  The Air Force implemented the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to fulfill the objective set forth by the NSTP 
(Hogan & Villhard, 2003, p. 1).  Updated NSTPs have been implemented over the years, the 
most recent released during President Barack Obama’s tenure in 2013.  In terms of content, the 
NSTP remains largely consistent with each new update, but with the introduction of different 
catalysts, parts of the policy have evolved to allow for innovation.  This line of thinking provided 
the question that started the research for this paper.  My impression, from having worked at Cape 
Canaveral for my first operational Air Force assignment, was that the dynamic nature of SpaceX 
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bred both inspiration and challenge.  I began to wonder how SpaceX’s accomplishments would 
affect American space policy.  But to understand a private company’s impact from a strategic 
perspective, I started at a higher level.   
What drives success in the space launch industry?  Ultimately, the launch industry is a 
business, just like any other, no matter if it is a private company or a contractor with significant 
government backing.  The market that SpaceX originally decided to target was the commercial 
satellite market, as the national security space market was already catered to other, government 
backed, companies.  The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program was a product 
of the 1994 NSTP, which called for the “development and implementation of a plan for evolving 
current expendable vehicles” (Wood, 2006).  Originally the government thought that the market 
for commercial payloads would provide a source of revenue for the EELV program: 
In November 1997, the Air Force foresaw what it considered a dramatic increase in the 
commercial-launch market. The service believed that both the commercial-launch 
industry and the government would benefit from developing a partnership whereby the 
government would spend less money to purchase launch service, while launch contractors 
would have permission to sell their services in the commercial marketplace to make up 
for—and perhaps exceed—the difference in revenue (Wood, 2006). 
Ultimately, the commercial market never materialized for the EELV sector, and they became 
almost entirely focused on national security space payloads.  Lockheed Martin and Boeing, the 
developers of the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets, respectively, eventually united under the shared 
company, United Launch Alliance (ULA) in 2005 ("Boeing & Lockheed Merge Rocket 
Divisions," 2005).  Now one company, this launch provider owned a monopoly on the national 
security space vehicle market.  Elon Musk saw the potential of an American competitor in the 
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commercial marketplace, and it became the target of his up and coming private launch 
corporation, SpaceX (Vance, 2015, p. 108).   
This is where my thought process began, with commercial payloads.  Starting with the 
distribution of commercial payloads, then how that distribution trended, and how that trend 
translated to profit for the United States private sector.  With more distribution toward the U.S., 
that creates more launch opportunities, which turns into more contracts and economic benefits, 
and finally, significant economic contributions that influence policy.  That is the theoretical 
journey of how commercial payloads at point A, eventually translated into national policy 
changes at point B.  The object of this research became either proving or disproving that path, 
which led to the below thesis question: 
How does the distribution of commercial satellite payloads between different launch 
providers influence the National Space Transportation Policy? 
The objective of my research is to look at how the distribution of commercial payloads could 
ultimately lead to a change in the National Space Transportation Policy.  I used the following 
questions to frame my research: 
1) What is the picture of the world commercial payload industry over the last five years? 
2) Focusing in on the United States, what is the distribution of commercial payloads to 
different launch providers over the past five years? 
3) For any distribution trends observed, what is the reason for that trend? 
4) How do you translate launch distribution into an economic value? 
5) How do you translate economic value into political influence?   
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6) How do you measure influence on a specific policy, the National Space Transportation 
Policy in this case? 
From these questions, I developed research methodology, which is discussed below. 
  6 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before delving into the existing research to establish a link between economic influence 
over policy decision, it is important to understand the background of the National Space 
Transportation Policy.  There are many kinds of rules and regulations that govern the space 
industry, such as policies which are released by the executive branch, the President, for overall 
guidance; laws are developed by Congress to govern the process by which the policy is 
implemented; and international treaties that laws must adhere to.  For the space launch industry, 
the NSTP spearheads the process.  While the NSTP provides the overall guidance, the associated 
laws provide the baseline on how the policy will be carried out.  The US Code, which represents 
federal statutes passed by Congress, has one devoted to national and commercial space 
programs, and a chapter specifically addressing commercial space launch activities, U.S. Code: 
Title 51 lays the legal framework for the private space launch industry (Enactment of Title 51--
National and Commercial Space Programs, 2010).  They work in tandem to vector the direction 
of America spacelift.  The theory of this paper is that the distribution of the number of 
commercial payloads amongst launch providers has an impact, through economic persuasion, on 
the content of the NSTP.  While there will be different economic-political concepts presented in 
this paper, the real proof of impact is found when looking at how Congress intends to carry out 
the policy and any subsequent legislation meant to incentivize, or make the regulatory process 
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easier.  Since Title 51 was enacted in 2010 there have been periodic updates to address the 
changing space landscape.  While law provides the implementation of policy, the journey to get 
to implementation is crucial.  Each step provides a piece of the puzzle that makes up the picture 
of the growth of the private space launch industry.   
The National Space Transportation Policy is a supplement document to the National 
Space Policy, periodically put out by the President of the United States outlining the strategy for 
space transportation in the coming years.  The most recent edition of the NSTP, published by the 
Barack Obama Administration, came out in 2013.  The policy is important because it directs the 
approach America will take, as well as the roles of different actors.  The main objective is to 
maintain America’s assured access to space, “[f]or the purpose of this policy, assured access is 
defined as sufficiently robust, responsive and resilient space transportation capabilities that are 
available to enable and advance civil and national security missions” (National Space 
Transportation Policy, 2013, p. 2).  This assured access to space responsibility has belonged to 
the government so far, but developing capabilities of the U.S. private space launch sector have 
provided an opportunity for this responsibility to shift.    
 The establishment of the Obama Administration’s space transportation principles did not 
start with the release of the 2013 NSTP; rather, the policy reinforced and followed previously 
established guidance.  In President Obama’s first year in office, 2010, one of the first actions he 
took regarding the space program was to cancel George W. Bush’s Constellation program.  In a 
budgetary move, Obama removed the initiative developing the Ares rocket to take humans back 
to the Moon.  Instead, he vectored the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
to focus on shuttling astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS), while working 
on a plan to eventually take humans to Mars (Matson, 2010).  With the impending retirement of 
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the Space Shuttle in 2011, the need to transfer responsibility of routine astronaut transportation 
to and from the ISS became more urgent.  The initiative to transition routine low Earth orbit 
missions, taking astronauts to the ISS, started with George W. Bush’s 2006 National Space 
Policy.  The policy called for the space sector to “[u]se U.S. commercial space capabilities and 
services to the maximum practical extent; purchase commercial capabilities and services when 
they are available in the commercial marketplace and meet […] [g]overnment requirements” 
("U.S. National Space Policy," 2006, p. 6).  To implement this directive, NASA established the 
Commercial Orbital Transportation Service (COTS) program to open competition to the private 
sector for development and demonstration of cargo and crew space transportation.  The COTS 
implementation strategy called for two phases.  Phase 1 was for “Technical 
Development/Demonstration,” funded by $500M of the FY07 budget; and Phase 2, “Competitive 
Procurement of Orbital Transportation Services for ISS logistical support” (Thorn, 2007).  In 
August 2006, NASA awarded contracts to Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and 
Rocketplane-Kistler “to develop and demonstrate commercial orbital transportation services that 
could open new markets and pave the way for contracts to launch and deliver crew and cargo to 
the [ISS]” (Braukus, Dickey, & Humphries, 2006).  While Rocketplane-Kistler was eventually 
dropped due to internal funding issues, SpaceX has since fully demonstrated and proven the 
success of the COTS program.  Ultimately, SpaceX is laying the blueprint on how civil-private 
partnerships can work.  
The National Space Transportation Policy cements the foundation laid in the current and 
previous National Space Policies.  It follows through on the determination to partner with the 
private sector to provide launch services to the U.S. Government; in fact, the partnership 
between government and the private/commercial sector is referenced ten times within the 
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document as related to goals and guidelines.  As stated earlier, the overarching goal is to provide 
assured access to space for American interests.  This means undisturbed access to desired orbits.  
In the event of a launch mishap or other situation that might require a launch vehicle family to be 
grounded for some period pending investigation, it is important that the United States maintain a 
second launch capability.  For this reason, launch vehicle redundancy was introduced as part of 
the EELV program in 1998.  Carrying that concept through this current policy, it concludes: 
“[e]nsure, to the maximum extent practicable, the availability of at least two U.S. space 
transportation vehicle families capable of reliably launching national security payloads” as part 
of the an overall plan to “[d]evelop […] launch concepts, techniques, and technologies needed 
for augmentation or rapid restoration of national security space capabilities during a time of 
crisis, conflict or in the event of a launch system failure” (National Space Transportation Policy, 
2013, p. 3).  This preference drives another strong reason for the United States to turn to the 
private sector for launch vehicle redundancy.  World events in 2015 made this an even greater 
point of emphasis, when Russia annexed a portion of Ukraine called Crimea.  Subsequently, the 
United States levied sanctions upon Russia and discontinued the use of the RD-180 engine, 
which powers the Atlas V booster (Wood, 2006).  This has driven ULA to work on a follow-on 
vehicle to the Atlas V, the Vulcan, using an American-made engine.     
As the applications of space capability and technology have grown into a necessity for 
daily life, the pressure on the commercial sector to meet customer demand continues to increase.  
With new and emerging commercial space companies, it is a competitive landscape for the 
limited resource of space launch.  There are a finite number of spaces for commercial payloads 
to launch each year across the world, but especially so in the United States where they are 
competing with national security and civil payloads for range time.  Further, launch costs in the 
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last few years have been prohibitive for many commercial ventures to launch from American 
soil.  While it appears that this may be changing, it is important to assess what industry 
information reveals related to the economics of commercial payloads and private space launch 
providers.  For the purpose of this paper, a commercial payload will be defined according to the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) definition:  
A commercial payload has one of both of these characteristics: [1] [t]he payload is 
operated by a private company [and] [2] [t]he payload is funded by the government, but 
provides satellite service partially or totally through a private or semi-private company.  
This distinction is usually applied to certain telecommunications satellites whose 
transponders are partially or totally leased to a variety of organizations, some or all of 
which generate revenues (Commercial Space Transportation 2014 Year in Review, 2015, 
p. 23). 
The following set of data is the distribution of commercial payloads launched by country for the 
last 5 years of available data (2010-2014).  The next six charts indicate the distribution of world 
orbital launches over that time period.  International commercial payload launch distribution 
over the last several years gives a good sense as to how the international market is trending and 
how competitive the United States is against international competition.  Below are the trending 
curves of commercial payload launches by country from 2010-2014.  These graphs cover all of 
the nations that launched one or more commercial satellites over these years, the data to produce 
these charts was provided by the annual Space Report, published by the Space Foundation. 
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Figure 1. Commercial Orbital Launch for the United States, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 2. Commercial Orbital Launch for Russia, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 3. Commercial Orbital Launch for China, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 4. Commercial Orbital Launch for Europe, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 5. Commercial Orbital Launch for Multinational, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 6. Commercial Orbital Launch for Sea Launch, 2010-2014. Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010-2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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From the graphical depictions, it is evident that the previous leader of commercial payload 
launches, Russia, is trending downward as of 2014.  At the same time, the commercial payload 
launch rate of the United States has increased steadily since 2011 and Europe has remained 
steady with an average of 5 commercial payload launches per year.  From these trends, it is clear 
that the United States is becoming more of a factor for international competition.  Next is the 
percentage of commercial payload launches by country and year for 2010-2014.  
 
Figure 7. Percentage of Commercial Launches by Country 2010, Adapted 
from The Space Report 2010, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 8. Percentage of Commercial Launches by Country 2011, Adapted 
from The Space Report 2011 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of Commercial Launches by Country 2012, Adapted 
from The Space Report 2012, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 10. Percentage of Commercial Launches by Country 2013, Adapted 
from The Space Report 2013, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 11. Percentage of Commercial Launches by Country 2014, Adapted 
from The Space Report 2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://www.spacefoundation.org/programs/research-and-analysis/space-report/.             
Adapted with permission. 
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The international market was previously dominated by Russia, with Europe as the second major 
contender.  The United States was often the third-wheel, bringing up the rear of the pack.  But 
something shifted between 2010 and 2014, the United States Russia and flip-flopped, Russia 
went from owning 57% of the market in 2010, to owning 18% in 2014, and the U.S went from a 
measly 17% in 2010, to attracting 50% of the market in 2014.  What was the catalyst to bring 
commercial business back to the United States?  Based upon international launch costs provided 
by the FAA in their Commercial Space Transportation, Year in Review series, the average cost 
of a Russian commercial launch was $71.4 million, with 13 total launches (Commercial Space 
Transportation: 2010 Year in Review, 2011, pp. 20-22).  There were 4 total commercial payloads 
delivered to orbit from the U.S. in 2010; of those launches, two launches were Falcon 9 
demonstration flights, one with an additional commercial payload, and the fourth was a Delta II.  
The average cost was $69 million for the Falcons, while the Delta II, the only American launch 
vehicle to carry a commercial payload that year, cost $95 million (Commercial Space 
Transportation: 2010 Year in Review, 2011, p. 22).  In 2011, the United States had zero 
commercial launches, while Russia had ten (Commercial Space Transportation: 2011 Year in 
Review, 2012, pp. 22-25).  The timeframe where the flip of the market occurred between the 
United States and Russia was between 2012 and 2014.  In 2012, Russia had seven commercial 
launches, at an average cost of $85 million.  The U.S. had two commercial launches, both on 
Falcon 9s and at average cost of $54 million.  These were the first commercially competed 
contracts that SpaceX flew, both from their COTS contract with NASA, that demonstrated their 
ability to resupply the ISS (Commercial Space Transportation: 2012 Year in Review, 2013, pp. 
29-32).  In 2013, Russia had twelve commercial launches, at an average price of $71.4 million, 
the U.S. had 5 commercial launches at an average of $61.8 million, with three Falcon 9 launches, 
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one Antares launch, and one developmental Minotaur launch (Commercial Space 
Transportation: 2013 Year in Review, 2014, pp. 14-17).  In 2014, Russia conducted four 
commercial launches at an average cost of $80M while the U.S. launched commercially eleven 
times at an average cost of $100 million.  However, looking at the launch distribution amongst 
American companies tells an interesting story, one in favor of private space launch.  Of the 
eleven launches, six were Falcon 9s, at an average of $61.2 million a launch, three Antares at an 
average of $80 million, Atlas V with one launch at $150M and a Delta Heavy, with the first test-
flight of EFT-1, NASA’s new crew capsule, coming in at a whopping $350M (Commercial 
Space Transportation: 2014 Year in Review, 2015, pp. 18-22).  Based upon the number of 
launches and average cost of launch, starting in 2010, Russia launched the majority of 
commercial payloads, but by 2014 the United States launched the preponderance of commercial 
payloads, most of them of Falcon 9s built by SpaceX.  This data indicates that SpaceX had a 
large hand in bringing back commercial satellite business to the United States with their lower 
cost compared to the Atlas V and Delta IV, both of which only had one commercial launch each 
over that same five-year time period.   
There are a number of different models to contextualize the influence of economic forces 
on policy with accompanying research literature to support them.  Researching pre-existing 
models provided the backdrop from which to develop my own application, looking for similar 
connections and applying those to the National Space Transportation Policy, an application in 
which I found no pre-existing research.  National political policy is influenced by a wide-variety 
of factors; according to The Sustainable Business Casebook, these factors include public opinion, 
economic conditions, technological change, Interest Groups, Business Associations and 
Nongovernmental Organizations (Gittell, Magnusson, & Merenda, 2016).  These are the 
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variables postulated to be influenced the most by the distribution of commercial launch payloads. 
A collection of variables is also captured by the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), which is 
explored below. 
Before looking at specific models where the economic condition is the primary influence 
on political decisions, looking at the macro-level decision environment provides the framework 
of where economic influence contributes.  To assess this environment, I looked at a traditional 
political process model, established by Kingdon in 1984, in his book Agenda, Alternatives, and 
Public Policies, and further explained in the article “Ambiguity and Multiple Streams” by 
Nikolaos Zahariadis.  The Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), as the theory is known, accepts 
the fact that the political environment is ambiguous.  “Ambiguity facilitates taking appropriate 
action and shaping preferences without a priori estimating the consequences” and the “Multiple 
Streams Approach (MSA) is a lens or framework […] that explains how policies are made by 
governments under conditions of ambiguity” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 34).  There may be a 
question as to how ambiguity applies to the latest version of the NSTP, after all, there were two 
previous versions before it to establish precedent; however, the national political environment in 
which each subsequent policy is enacted varies.  So the ambiguity in this case is the environment 
in which the most recent policy was published.  Below is a visual of the MSA process: 
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Figure 12. Diagram of the Multiple Streams Framework, Reprinted from “Theories of the Policy 
Process,” edited by P.A. Sabatier and C.M. Weible, 2014, p. 41. Adapted with permission. 
 
As seen from the visual, there are four inputs, three “streams” and a fourth input, policy 
entrepreneurs.  The “policy stream,” “politics stream,” and “policy stream” which feeds into the 
“policy entrepreneurs” are composed of numerous variables which lead to the “policy window,” 
the period where policy decisions are made.  This model is unique in that its central 
consideration is time.  In this model, the entities that accept ambiguity, such as organizations or 
governments, are referred to as “organized anarchies.” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 35).  In 
organizational anarchies, “[d]ecisions are made as the process unfolds […].  This situation stands 
in stark contrast to decision-making in most business firms, where the ultimate goal is clear—to 
make a profit” and “organized anarchies ‘can be described better as a collection of ideas than as 
a coherent structure’” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 36).  This model is about making sense out of 
a highly unpredictable process in which the only constant is time, and a limited resource at that.  
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Given the ambiguity, it is important to look at the external factors, that become systemic once 
entered as inputs.   
 The first stream into the policy window is the problem stream which “consists of various 
conditions that policymakers and citizens want addressed” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 41).  
From a federal perspective, problems compete for national attention and resources.  They are the 
issues that are more important and most visible to voters during the policy window.  Of course, 
this component may be manipulated by policy entrepreneurs by focusing attention specifically on 
one problem or another.  
 The next stream is policy.  Policies are described as “a ‘primeval soup’ of ideas that 
compete to win acceptance in policy networks” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 42).  In other 
words, the various proposals put forward for consideration to address specific issues.  Only a few 
ideas will receive serious consideration, “[s]election criteria include technical feasibility, value 
acceptability, and resource adequacy” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 42).   
 The last stream is the politic stream, which is composed of three considerations: “the 
national mood, pressure-group campaigns and administrative or legislative turnover” (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2014, p. 43).  This is the input where legislatures pay attention to public opinion polls on 
certain issues, pressure from actors working on behalf of a specific cause (lobbyists), and finally, 
a potentially significant impact to Congress is the turnover of lawmakers.  Not only does this 
affect individual Legislature’s preferences, but big party demographics as well, which affect the 
makeup of the legislative agenda.   
 A policy window is a period-of-time where the three streams overlap.  Kingdon described 
these moments as “’opportunit[ies] for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to 
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push attention to their special problems’ […] [and] define the context within which policy is 
made” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 44).  Policy windows are often opened by significant events 
that focus attention on an issue; an extreme example of this would be after the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the United States was 
grieving the loss of many lives and wanted someone held responsible.  This unrest fueled 
Congress to declare the War on Terrorism, which most likely would not have occurred had it not 
been for the 11 September terrorist attacks.  The event opened the policy window and provided a 
catalyst for policy decisions. While policy windows can overlap, the “MSA assumes windows 
open one at a time” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 44).  A policy window must be open for the 
three streams to flow into it and policy established. 
 Policy entrepreneurs are individuals or organizations who work to combine the three 
streams into action.  “They are more than mere advocates of particular solutions; they are power 
brokers, coalition enablers, and manipulators of problematic preferences and unclear technology” 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 45).  While policy entrepreneurs are not always successful, those 
who have the most impact are the ones “who have greater access to policymakers.  For example, 
the Adam Smith Institute had great access to the government during Margaret Thatcher’s tenure 
in power in retain because its ideologies matched her more closely than those of other groups” 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 45).  Also, those with more resources at their disposal (ability to 
devote more time, money, and energy) accomplish more (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 45).  
Policy entrepreneurs are those with the ability to influence legislative attention and decision.  
 While MSA has a place in this paper based upon its logic flow and its applicability to the 
presented issue, there are documented concerns about the process.  One of which was argued by 
“Bendor, Moe, and Shott (2001) critizi[ing] the logic and conclusions of the original garbage can 
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[model] […]; [b]ecause that conceptualization served as an inspiration for the MSA, 
undermining the former adversely affects the latter” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 50).  What this 
concern really points to is “[a]re the conclusion of the MSA empirically based rather than 
assumption driven?” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 50).  For the purposes of this paper, a 
quantitate analysis using this model will not be performed, however, a thought experiment with 
the streams, applying the parameters of the thesis question, will be analyzed to provide context 
for the case study application in the methodology and analysis sections. 
 Economic influence on policy has been an example of conjectural study in the past with 
thought experiments like the MSA.  Previously, there were no empirical models to connect 
economic variables to changes in national policy.  Classic examination depended upon case 
studies with objective lessons extrapolated.  As recently as the 1970s, however, there have been a 
few efforts to quantify the effect of economics on politics.  In a 1977 volume of The American 
Political Science Review, an article was published by Dr. Lester M. Salamon and Dr. John J. 
Siegfried, acknowledged this lack of a systematic approach and proposed a new hypothesis, 
considering economic structure, previously untested.   
[W]e believe that economic structure is an important variable and that there are ways to  
measure its politically relevant dimensions […]. […] The approach we have adopted […] 
is to formulate a measure of the successful exercise of political power that can be used to 
generate an index of political effectiveness for all industries, and that can be related to 
indices of economic structure (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977, p. 1035). 
In other words, they measured an industry’s successful political influence off the policies that 
appeared to favor it.  They identified five dimensions of the economic structure for correlation 
comparison.  These included Firm Size, Industry Size, Concentration, Profit Rate and 
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Geographic Dispersion (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977, p. 1034).  The model used the federal 
corporate income tax rates and its deviation within several industries, “[w]hat the model will tell 
us […] is whether any portion of the variation in Tax Avoidance Rates can be attributed to 
variation in political influence flowing from variation in economic structure, and, if so, which 
aspects of economic structure are most important’ (Salamon & Siegfried, 1977, p. 1036).  
Altogether, the five factors accounted for 16% of the variation in corporate tax avoidance rates, 
at a 95% confidence level.  There was an especially “positive relationship between firm size and 
Tax Avoidance Rates” indicating the influence of corporate size on political outcome (Salamon 
& Siegfried, 1977, pp. 1038-1039).  While 16% may not prove a substantial outcome, for the 
number of industries examined and covering multiple scenarios, it empirically confirmed a 
correlation.  This is an early example of a systematic study of a relationship of economic 
influence over political outcome.  A more modern study, more applicable to the problem of 
space launch, was conducted in 2014.   
 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page conducted a study asking the questions “[w]ho 
governs?  Who actually rules? To what extent is the broad body of U.S. citizens’ sovereign, 
semi-sovereign, or largely powerless?” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 564).  There are four traditional 
theories applied to American political study that are examined.  They are Majoritarian Electoral 
Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism.  Each 
“offers different predications about which sets of actors have how much influence over public 
policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-
oriented” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 564).  This study is unique in that it is able to compare the 
different theories using a single statistical, multivariable model.  To define what the four theories 
are is to understand what kind of person or group influences political matters the most.  
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Majoritarian Electoral Democracy might be thought of as the ideal; where the decision lies with 
the majority preference of the average citizen, through the power of the vote (Gilens & Page, 
2014, p. 565).  Economic-Elite Dominion is the theory that the real political power is wielded by 
those with significant economic resources, with advocative and financial means at their disposal, 
such as lobbyists, foundations, think-tanks and campaign monetary contribution, economic-elites 
can configure the political landscape in their favor (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 566).  Majoritarian 
Pluralism focuses on how public policy reflects the stance of organized interest groups.  In David 
Truman’s The Governmental Process, he focuses on groups as central to politics: 
[An idea] that tends to increase both the plausibility and the normative appeal of 
majoritarian interest-group pluralism: the assertion that all interests have at least a 
minimum of influence in group-dominated policy making, because policy makers must 
(in order to avoid subsequent punishment) heed all “potential” groups that would form in 
their interests were trampled upon (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 566).   
In this way, potential interest groups of the dispersed population of the United States provides 
the potential to consolidate and form an interest group to convey their collective desire(s).  
Biased Pluralism suggests that the political outcome of struggles amongst competing interest 
groups will represent the wishes of big business and corporations.  By employing their economic 
means and tactics referenced earlier; namely lobbyists and political party or campaign funding, 
can push for more favorable policies to their economic interests.   
As to the empirical evidence concerning interest groups, it is well established that 
organized groups regularly lobby and fraternize with public officials, move through 
revolving doors between public and private employment, provide self-serving 
information to officials, draft legislation, and spend a great deal of money on election 
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campaigns. Moreover, […] the evidence clearly indicates that most interest groups and 
lobbyists represent business firms or professionals.  Relatively few represent the poor or 
even the economic interests of ordinary workers […] (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 567).   
Biased Pluralism points to the influence of substantial economic resources of big business lead to 
the creation of the majority of interest groups that advocate their corporate positions.  
Understanding the fundamentals of the four theories establishes the context of the 2014 study.   
 The Gilens and Page Study utilized a unique data set that they themselves compiled, 
related to assess the influence of different income levels of citizens.  Using an income 
distribution that included the affluent on one end and poor on the other and those in-between.   
[They] gathered data on a large, diverse set of policies cases: 1,779 instances between 
1981 and 2002 in which a national survey of the general public asked a favor/oppose 
question about a proposed policy change.  […] [Those] 1,779 cases […] met the criteria 
of providing income breakdowns for respondents, not involving a Constitutional 
amendment or Supreme Court ruling […], and involving a clear, as opposed to a partial 
or ambiguous, actual presence or absence of a policy change (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 
568).   
The researchers then assessed responses based on income level; they categorized at the “tenth 
income percentile (quite poor), the fifteenth percentile (median), and the nineteenth percentile 
(fairly affluent)” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 568).   They then used the policy preference data to 
measure two independent variables thought of as major influences upon the aforementioned 
theories (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 568).  By corresponding each theory to an income level, the 
median is the average American, the affluent correlate to the nineteenth percentile, while the 
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“’affluent’ respondents received only about $146,000 [in 2012 dollars] in annual household 
income” it can be safely assumed, based on corroborating data (2011 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study) that suggests the top 2 percent of income earners (truly wealthy) “are much more 
highly correlated with the preferences of the top 10 percent of earners” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 
569).  Correlating income levels allows for the assessment of the Majoritarian Electoral 
Democracy and Economic-Elite Domination.  For interest groups, the correlation was a more 
complex process.  For comparison, the research team developed a measure of Net Interest Group 
Alignment, using those interest groups that appeared in the “Power 25” list found in Forbes, they 
included the ten top industries reporting the highest lobbying expenditures.  They then looked at 
the stance of the interest groups, if they were in agreement or not with a certain policy change, 
and then calculated the Net Interest Group Alignment using an algorithm (Gilens & Page, 2014, 
p. 569).  Using their single statistical model, they then measured the independent variables’ 
(median, affluent and Net Interest Group Alignment) impact on the dependent variable (policy) 
change.  They later distinguished between mass-based and business/professional interest groups 
using different measures of net interest group alignment, specific to either mass-based interest 
groups or business/professional interest groups (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 569).  The theories (as 
independent variables that affect the dependent variable of policy) were modeled separately, 
which led to a predictably high correlation with the variable’s respective study.  This means that, 
when tested by themselves, each theory had a significant impact on political decisions.  But 
when all three independent variables where modeled together, the outcome changed profoundly.  
“Clearly the median citizen or “median voter” at the heart of theories of Majoritarian Electoral 
Democracy does not do well when put up against economic elites and organized interest group 
[…], they have little or no independent influence on policy at all” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 572).  
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Economic elites, on the other hand, were estimated to have substantial influence on policy.  
“This does not mean that theories of Economic-Elite Domination are wholly upheld, since [the] 
results indicate that individual elites must share their policy influence with organized interest 
groups.  Still, economic elites stand out as quite influential—more so than [the] other actors 
study here […]” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 572).  Organized interest groups also represent a 
significant influence on U.S. public policy.   Below is the table summarizing the results of the 
single variable models, and the multi-variable model 4. 
Table 1 
 
Note. Policy Outcomes and the policy preferences of average citizen, economic elites, and 
interest groups in single variable models 1-3 and multivariable model 4. Reprinted from “Testing 
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” by M. Gilens and 
B.I. Page, 2014, Perspectives on Politics, volume 12/number 3, p. 571. Adapted with permission. 
To distinguish between mass-based and business/professional interest groups, the researchers 
computed different net interest group alignment indices, including both in a new multivariate 
analysis that included the preferences of the economic elites and average citizens, the results are 
shown below in Table 2.  The resulting data indicates that Biased Pluralism fared much better 
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than the Majoritarian Pluralism theory.  The analysis indicates that business/professional interest 
groups are twice as effective as mass-based interest groups (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 574).     
Table 2 
 
Note. The separate policy impact of business-oriented and mass-based interest groups. Reprinted 
from “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” by 
M. Gilens and B.I. Page, 2014, Perspectives on Politics, volume 12/number 3, p. 575. Adapted 
with permission. 
All in all, the results of this study indicate that the affluent, business-oriented class of the United 
States maintains a strong influence on public policy determination. Based on the advocative 
resources at their disposal, lobbyists and think tanks often help their causes, and the ability to 
finance campaigns of political leaders all play a role in their ability to effect policy.  Moreover, 
business-oriented interest groups, which could arguably be categorized as another tool of the 
economic elite, also provides a source of political effectiveness.  Having resources to further a 
specific cause goes a long way in favorable policy formation. 
In the previous study, the results indicated that having financial resources available 
greatly benefited business-oriented Americans.  Delving more into what those resources are and 
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which are the most influential, developing strategies using these resources is the next step.  In a 
1980 study by John C. Aplin and W. Harvey Hegarty of Indiana University, strategies used by 
“business lobbyists, consumer groups, unions, and federal agencies employ to shape federal 
legislation” were examined (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 438).  This study was conducted in two 
phases, the first included interviews of six chief legislative assistants, to establish the structure of 
a questionnaire.  Following this step, in phase two, the researchers interviewed “36 senators, 
congressmen, and key legislative assistants in the 95th Congress […].  […] Information 
produced in this phase provided the basis for the development of a survey instrument to examine 
influence techniques and their impacts.” (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 444).  From these 
interviews, four strategies of influence emerged: “strategies based on information; strategies 
relying on public exposure and appeals; strategies employed employing direct power; and 
strategies depending on political pressure” (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 444).  Twelve techniques 
that influenced each strategy were represented in the survey, and the participants were asked to 
rate the influence of each technique on a scale from “’very negative impact’ (scale value = -10) 
to a ‘very positive impact’ (scale value = +10) […] [t]he middle point (scale value = 0) was 
described as ‘having little or no impact” (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 445).  The final population 
that was surveyed “consisted of 435 chief legislative assistants in the U.S. House of 
Representatives during the 95[th] Congress” who were chosen due to their positions as 
gatekeepers on legislative issues (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 444).  The legislative assistants’ 
responsibilities include “framing proposed legislation, evaluation bills, attending important 
committee sessions, and generally advising their congressional sponsor on major floor and 
committee decisions,” these individuals are employed due to the congressperson’s numerous 
commitments and restricted availability (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 445).  That makes this 
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demographic qualified to understand which influence strategies work best.  The team received 
back a useable response from 145 offices, a rate of 33.3 percent (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 445).  
Results revealed that those surveyed were an educated group, with 96% having college degrees 
and 38 percent with graduate degrees, the majority of which were law degrees (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980, p. 445).  The first hypothesis of this study, that the three sectors identified would not adopt 
significantly different strategies, was rejected.  The analysis revealed that the three sectors do use 
vastly different influence strategies.  For the purpose of this paper, the influence sector of interest 
is the Industry and Business Groups.  Findings showed that the Industry and Business Groups 
sector utilized the Information influence strategy the most, followed by Public Exposure/Appeal, 
Direct Pressure, and lastly, Political (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, p. 446).   Below is a graphic 
depicting the results: 
Table 3 
Note. Use of Influence Strategies by Type of Influence Sector. Reprinted from “Political 
Influence: Strategies Employed by Organizations to Impact Legislation in Business and 
Economic,” by J.C. Aplin and W.H. Hegarty, 1980, Academy of Management Journal, volume 
23/number 3, p. 446. Adapted with permission. 
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The respondents were then asked to rate the perceived impact of the influence strategies on a 20-
point scale: Political strategies rated as having the most impact, followed by Information, Public 
Exposure with Direct Pressure creating a negative impact.  Those rated as having the highest 
impact were the more positive, where Direct Pressure was seen as negative.  The applicability of 
this study is found in the link between possessing an economic power in Industry and Business 
groups by having access to resources to advocate on their behalf, and then exercising those 
resources to influence the legislative process.  As information is used as the primary strategy of 
the Industry and Business group, its role is essential: to “influenc[e] political proposals” (Aplin 
& Hegarty, 1980, p. 448).  Secondly is Public Exposure/Appeal.  It is important to keep in mind 
that this study was conducted in 1980, and the impact of Public Exposure and Appeal has 
increased tremendously since then, potentially becoming more important than Information.  
While a Political strategy is about contacting voters directly, which could potentially affect a 
congressman’s changes of getting reelected, Public Exposure and Media may now be more 
effective in affecting a bid for reelection due to targeted marketing.  “Ultimately the internal 
power of a congressman possesses relies upon being reelected and gaining assignment to 
prestigious House committees.  […] Influence groups that operate through constituents or 
colleagues could directly effect (sic) eventual outcomes to the congressman” (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980, p. 448).  This can potentially be applied to both Political strategy and the Public 
Exposure/Appeal strategy. 
 An essay entitled “Do[es] the media affect the decision of policy makers in domestic 
policy,” suggests the topic can be examined from two analytical perspectives, the first is to “how 
and to what extent power balance among three pivotal actors in the political communication 
system—‘media, government and public’—may be skewed in favour (sic) of one or more 
  33 
 
subjects” and the second is who represents the media from a power and structure perspective 
(Soukenik, n.d., p. 2).  Public policy making is defined as “’a set of processes consisting of 
setting of the agenda, specification of alternatives, authoritative choice and implementation” in 
which different players take part, which includes both media and interest groups, in addition to 
others (Soukenik, n.d., p. 3).  As players in this process, both the media and interest groups can 
influence different parts.  For instance, the media may form a “coalition with the public” in 
which case the media is advocating on behalf of a cause, which could impact authoritative choice 
(Soukenik, n.d., p. 4).  At the core of the public policy process is a relational triad framework of 
the media, government and public (Soukenik, n.d., p. 3).  When different additional actors enter 
the fold, it creates another element and upsets the power balance.  The strength of this influence 
can be explained from the Political economy perspective. 
 The Political economy perspective is the analysis of “’power relations, that mutually 
constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources, including communication 
resources’” (Soukenik, n.d., p. 6).  As mentioned above, by introducing additional agents, the 
power balance of the triangular framework is reworked, based upon the intent of the imposing 
group or groups.  Based upon this, and what side of the issue the media, government or public 
falls, one or more of their positions could either be bolstered or weakened by the injection of 
support or opposition.  Tying this to the Aplin and Hegarty study of 1980, one or more actors 
joining forces on an issue, for instance, an interest group  and the media align on a certain 
subject, two types of Influence strategies can thus be used to persuade legislatures to take action 
on the issue; the Information and Public Exposure/Appeal strategy may be employed by the 
interest group to both educate and disseminate lessons on the issue to the public, who then may 
pressure their legislatures to vote in favor of the interest group.  Conversely, the strategies may 
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backfire if the public is disagreeable to the desired outcome of the interest group, it may drive the 
legislature to vote counter to the desired outcome, especially if the information is presented in an 
ineffective way.  In this way, the media affects public policy decision making.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This research addresses the question: How does the distribution of commercial satellite 
payloads between different launch providers influence the National Space Transportation 
Policy?  To analyze and contextualize this question, some assumptions are made.  It is easy for a 
question like this to become wide-spread and encompass many different variables.  However, the 
aim here is to look at the question in its most simplistic form.  Given those models presented in 
the literature review, it is difficult to quantify this topic, therefore this is primarily a qualitative 
analysis with the aid of simplistic quantitative analysis to inform the discussion and conclusion.  
I will apply the qualitative Multiple Stream Approach then follow this with simple qualitative 
examination based upon variables and principles learned from the 1977 article by Salamon and 
Siegfried and the 2014 study by Gilens and Page, both of which sought to establish a link 
between economic standing and political influence.  Given this information, therefore, the 
following assumptions are made: 
1) The flow of events from launch distribution to economic impact to policy influence is 
assumed to be a closed system.  While there are undoubtedly an unknown number of 
inputs that go into policy decisions, this research focuses, both qualitative and 
empirical will focus on the economic catalyst.    
2) Developing an empirical process to derive an economic value that drives policy 
processes is beyond the scope of this research.  Therefore, the study of Gilens and 
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3) Page and their conclusions related to economic elites, are accepted for this analysis.  
Private spacelift companies are assumed to be economic elites (measured as the 
ninetieth percentile) based on the aforementioned article. 
4) After accepting the Gilens and Page definition of an economic elite, there is no 
definitive way to prove a direct link between economic influence on policy change.  
However, relating private spacelift companies and their available resources, and how 
they executed those resources to corresponding changes in the subsequent version of 
the NSTP, allows us to see if there is a correlation. 
Now that the assumptions have been presented, the first step is to do the qualitative analysis of 
applying the Multiple Stream Approach to the spacelift industry, which is ultimately more of a 
thought experiment.  By inputting the specific scenario of launch distribution, to economic 
impact, into the various streams, one may conjecture what the policy output will be.  While this 
does not provide empirical data, it allows for further framing of the problem. 
Next are the simple empirical studies; the crux of which comes from establishing how to 
translate launch distribution into an economic value, and consequently, how to measure the 
effect on a specific national policy.  Based upon the studies examined in the Literature Review, 
the common thread among them is establishing a metric by which to measure.  Lessons learned 
from the Literature Review indicate that there are several variables that influence the 
development of public policy, including multiple applications or strategies of economic 
influence.  But the basic premise comes down to whether or not an agency has the resources 
available to influence, regardless of the specific strategy employed.  In the context of the thesis 
question, how does the distribution of commercial spacecraft payloads between different launch 
providers influence the NSTP?  The metric by which to measure, are the resources available to 
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space launch providers, and how are they used.  How do you measure resources available?  What 
that translates into is the financial means these launch providers have available to employ 
strategies of influence.  Because of the proprietary nature of private launch companies, the 
simplest way to measure financial well-being of a company is the value of their contracts.  
Assigning monetary values to their current and future contracts allows for the establishment of 
whether they are economic elites or not.  For this research, the demographic of the “economic-
elite” is established based upon the 2014 Gilens and Page study discussed earlier.  For the 
purposes of their study, their “’affluent’ respondents received only about $146,000 in annual 
household income” (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 568).  While this does not delve into the 
stratosphere of the truly wealthy, Gilens and Page argue that this demographic does not differ 
significantly than the “truly wealthy” based upon the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Study: 
Based on 13 policy-preference questions asked on this survey the preferences of the top 
2 percent of income earners (a group that might be thought “truly wealthy) are much 
more highly correlated with the preferences of the top 10 percent of earners than with the 
preference of the average survey respondent (r=.91 versus .69) (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 
567).  
Using SpaceX as my case study, and this definition of an economic elite, a household that makes 
at or above $146,000 a year, I established that Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX qualifies as an 
economic elite based upon his personal net worth which, according to Forbes, is $12.1 billion 
("Elon Musk: Real Time Net Worth," 2016).  Along with Musk’s personal economic-elite status, 
I took the label one step further and applied it to his company, SpaceX, which I will treat as a 
single influencer for the purpose of this study.  While SpaceX provides the case study, other 
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space launch providers would also fall into this category.  However, the difference becomes how 
each company utilizes its financial resources to advance its cause.  SpaceX has proven 
aggressive at using its resources, while other providers have been more reserved.  Since 
SpaceX’s profits have not been made publicly available at this time, I based their financial well-
being and economic-elite status based upon the value of their current and future launch contracts, 
which correlate to an income.   
Based upon the assessment that space launch providers are truly economic elites, their 
various influence strategies were examined as to whether they are used and to what extent.  The 
extent of the strategies used is based on the money and hours spent on each strategy using 
publicly available information.  Since the actual public policy decision-making process is 
subjective, based upon the ideas and perceptions of the voting members, it is impossible to test a 
specific quantitative input to a similar output.  To make the jump from influence to policy effect, 
a correlation based approach was used, similar to the 2014 Gilens and Page study that measured 
favorable vs. unfavorable outcomes.  The approach used here is a comparative text approach, 
meaning I compared the change of verbal occurrences from the 1994 policy to the 2004 policy, 
and then the 2004 policy to the 2013 policy.  Because the formats are different between the three, 
I could not conduct a word-for-word comparison.  To account for the format differences, I used a 
subject occurrence approach.  The first analysis I conducted was a simple keyword search, for 
the words “private” and “commercial” to trend how often they showed up in each document.  
These words were chosen based upon the assumption that the more often they showed up, the 
more favorable the policy is toward the private space transportation industry.    
Next I conducted a weighted sum analysis.  While the weighted sum analysis is 
traditionally used for decision making, its holds applicability here, as to compare each version 
  39 
 
and decide upon which is most favorable toward the private space launch industry.  I used six 
different subject categories based upon the subject’s favorable outlook for private space launch.  
Looking only at positive subjects allowed me to simplify my research by being able to weigh 
their respective importance and outputting a single variable, the highest weighted sum indicated 
the most favorable policy.  The six subject criteria were assigned a criteria weight based upon 
their relative ease with which they allow the private sector to flourish.  While there is 
subjectivity in assigning these criteria weight, justifications are provided.  After the criteria 
weight was assigned, I counted the total number of occurrences of each subject category, and 
then multiplied by the criteria weight for a weighted score.  I then added up the weighted scores 
from each policy, and the highest weighted scored indicated the most favorable policy toward 
private space launch.   
The last metric I used to assess the change in the space policies was based upon a 
comparison completed in an article by Jeff Foust, who provided main point differences and the 
actual verbiage that changed with it.  He highlighted a different area that I did not assess in my 
subject analysis as it did not pertain directly to the private sector, but nonetheless provides them 
an opportunity for a market that they can grow into, which is discussed in the following section.  
After the Analysis and Results are presented, to prove or disprove that economic resources 
influence policy change, SpaceX is examined as a case study on how they have used their 
resources to advocate for their business in the past.
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The Multiple Streams Approach is based off the classic “garbage can” model.  The 
garbage can model is an organizational decision-making simulation where it is assumed that 
organizations are in a state of anarchy.  Among the chaos, many superfluous solutions are 
developed as part of the “garbage” where actual decisions come about as part of the interplay of 
four organizational streams, Problems, Solutions, Participants, and Choice Opportunities, all as 
functions of time (Cohen, March and Olsen).  While not getting into the specifics of the garbage 
can model, the MSA framework is derived from it. 
Applying MSA to the issue of how the NSTP is influenced by launch distribution, the 
assumption is that this leads to profit for the private industry and that launch profit is considered 
an economic influencer on the NSTP by two streams.  The first is that private profit provides for 
greater resources in influencing, which has already been discussed in the Literature Review and 
Methodology sections, and is applied through the policy entrepreneur.  The role of policy 
entrepreneur is played by the private spacelift companies and profit is the resource by which they 
push their vison.  Profit allows these corporations a means and options to execute their agendas.  
The second avenue where profit provides an economic influence, is through the politics stream, 
which particularly feeds into the national mood and pressure-group campaigns.  The national 
mood is affected by economic benefit; in this case, in a scenario where private spacelift is not 
only providing a profit, but creating jobs and providing a cheaper launch option, the national 
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mood is for it.  While there is no specific data toward private space launch, especially for the 
earlier NSTPs, looking at how American’s support the national space budget provides some 
insight on how policy might respond.  If this scenario is true, then not only does it provide an 
economic benefit, it allows for the government to invest less money into space travel and free it 
up for other projects, and secondly it allows America to continue with its long and robust space 
tradition, which projects a strong national image.  These two inputs, as well as other factors 
within the respective streams, contribute to opening up a policy window in which the time is 
right for a decision.  The policy windows for the NSTPs would have occurred right before each 
one was signed.  So the two scenarios to examine before each policy was signed are the national 
mood related to the space budget and resources available to private spacelift.  However, the 
national mood, as it relates to the NSTP specifically, is extremely hard to quantify.  There are 
various polls and surveys asking different questions related to different parts of the American 
space program, but nothing specific to the NSTP or private spacelift.  
Since the first version of the National Space Transportation Policy was introduced in 
1994, there have been two updates released by subsequent presidential administrations.  The first 
was put out on 21 December 2004 by President George W. Bush.  The third, and most recent, 
was published by President Barack Obama in 21 November 2013.  The National Opinion 
Research Center’s General Social Survey, based out of the University of Chicago, has surveyed 
the public for 40 years on “their views of space exploration and federal funding of it” (Wormald, 
2014).  Below are pie charts depicting the percentage of respondents who answered either, “too 
little, about right, or too much” (Wormald, 2014).  The displayed is from the time period 
immediately preceding the year each version was delivered.  However, starting in 1994, the 
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survey transitioned from being conducted every year, to every two years.  For this reason, the 
years around 2003, which directly proceeded the 2004 NSTP, are both included, 2002 and 2004.   
 
Figure 13. Percentage of respondent answers to the General Social Survey’s question of funding 
for national space program.  1993, Adapted from The General Society Survey, 2016. Retrieved 
from http://gss.norc.org/. Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 14. Percentage of respondent answers to the General Social Survey’s question of funding 
for national space program. 2002, Adapted from The Space Report 2014, 2016, Retrieved from 
http://gss.norc.org/. Adapted with permission. 
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Figure 15. Percentage of respondent answers to the General Social Survey’s question of funding 
for national space program. 2004, Adapted from The General Society Survey, 2016, Retrieved 
from http://gss.norc.org/. Adapted with permission. 
 
 
Figure 16. Percentage of respondent answers to the General Social Survey’s question of funding 
for national space program. 2012, Adapted from The General Society Survey, 2016, Retrieved 
from http://gss.norc.org/. Adapted with permission. 
 
In 1994, President Clinton was in office.  These survey results indicate that 51% of 
respondents, a majority, believed the government was spending too much money on the space 
program.  Interestingly, the budget for NASA had increased for 1994.  “NASA got $14.5 billion, 
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$200 million more than 1993” (Anderson and Mervis, 1993, 173).  NASA wanted to focus more 
on scientific technology development, expanding beyond just manned spaceflight; they had the 
ability to do that as their budget allowed.  What conclusions can be drawn from this?  For the 
1994 NSTP, while this is an input in to politics stream, it may not be the strongest input with 
other variables outweighing it.  Secondly, the next variable to examine is the resources available 
to the private launch industry at the time.  In 1994, the thought of a private launch industry, as it 
is today, did not exist, which means this input is not-applicable.   
The 2004 version of the NSTP was signed by President George W. Bush. There was no 
2003 data to look at, so 2002 and 2004 are used instead.  In 2002, 50% of respondents said that 
the budget was about right, whereas 31% said that it was too much.  In 2004, 45% indicated that 
the budget was about right, and 41% said it was too much.  In February 2003, the Space Shuttle 
Columbia broke apart coming back to Earth and seven crew members died as the vessel 
disintegrated.  Given this tragedy happened right before the 2004 NSTP, people might have been 
reluctant to fund a space program where humans had just died.  However, it was also a few short 
years following the 11 September 2011 terrorist attacks, so it is not a stretch to say that 
maintaining a strong national image was important to Americans at that time, and the space 
program is a measure of strength and unity.  Given these conflicting scenarios, the fact that most 
respondents expressed that the budget was just right indicates that the public still had faith in the 
space program and were satisfied with the level of funding.  President Bush unveiled his vision 
for human spaceflight, taking men back to the Moon and to Mars in January 2004.  The 
President’s requested space budget, which had been prepared before the shuttle accident, 
requested an increase of 3.1% (Fox New, “NASA Budget…).  NASA’s budget in 2004 was 
$15.46 billion, which was slightly more than the 2003 budget of $15 billion.   
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The 2013 NSTP was established by President Obama.  The numbers show that 45% of 
those surveyed believe the space budget was just right, and 33% said that it was too much.  The 
FY2013 budget decreased from the previous year, from $17.8 billion to $16.9 billion.  While the 
majority of respondents believed that the space program was funded correctly, FY2013 was a 
turbulent year for the nation’s pocketbook.  It was then the mandatory sequestration measures 
went into effect because Congress could not agree on a budget.  Many federal employees were 
furloughed as a result, thus not working or receiving any pay.  The nation was affected by 
significant budget cuts across the board.  Again this indicates that while public support/national 
mood was indeed an input, there were higher priority inputs that influenced budget cuts across 
the spectrum of government activities, not just space.   
So what are the conclusions drawn from the national mood variable that feeds into the 
politics stream?  Matching the General Social Survey up with the actual budget numbers garners 
an inconclusive correlation.  While national mood is most certainly a component of the politics 
stream, it is a consideration and may not have the influential power of other factors within the 
model and does not significantly contribute to the theory as it applies to the NSTP. 
The next input for investigation into the MSA is the policy entrepreneur.  In application 
to the NSTP, the policy entrepreneur represents an economic input of resources available to the 
beneficiaries of the policy, the private launch industry, to influence decisions in their favor.  This 
input of policy entrepreneur overlaps with the Gilens and Page concept of an Economic Elite, 
used to define private launch companies, when applying this model to the NSTP.  They are both 
defined as having the ability to access resources, which comes as a result of profit.  I will not 
delve deeply into this variable as it is expressed below as part of the Gilens and Page application, 
in the case study of SpaceX.  Inserting that element of the case study here, SpaceX has been 
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profitable and has utilized their resources quite effectively from a legislative perspective.  This is 
investigated later.  But based off of the results, this is a more significant input into the MSA than 
the national mood.  Regardless, both of these streams feed into a Policy Window, when the time 
and circumstances are right for policy decisions to be made.  The policy window is hard to 
measure, but the results of this time period are reflected in the upcoming text analysis and 
comparison.  The Multiple Stream Approach is used as a process framework to understand the 
numerous factors and timing that goes into making policy decisions.  In the case of how it affects 
the three versions of the NSTP, how the national mood component relates to budget support is 
inconclusive.  But when looking from the perspective of a policy entrepreneur, the story is a little 
different, as shown later.  Moving on from the MSA, the next step is moving from qualitative 
analysis to the quantitative, using simple text comparisons to understand how the content has 
changed from one version to the next. 
The empirical correlation study I conducted was done using a side-by-side comparison 
with two different objectives.  The first was to establish common themes among the three 
policies, to develop a baseline of continuous space transportation themes.  The second objective 
was to highlight differences relating to the commercial space launch industry and whether an 
uptick in favorable policy verbiage appears.  Especially important are those between the 2004 
version and the 2013 version, because the time in between signifies the interim when the private 
spacelift industry found its footing to compete with established launch providers. 
 To begin the analysis, I did a simple keyword search of all three versions of the policy to 
produce a trend of how often the words “private” and “commercial” are used respectively.  In the 
1994 edition, the word “private” appeared 11 times, and when “commercial” was searched, it 
appeared 26 times.  Interestingly, when “private” was searched in the 2004 policy, it only 
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appeared 4 total times, with “commercial” totaling 30 occurrences.  Finally, “private” appeared 
10 times and “commercial” 27 times appeared in the 2013 version.    Below is a bar graph for 
visual trending: 
 
Figure 17. Keyword Occurrences of the words “Private” and “Commercial” in the 1994, 2004, 
and 2013 National Space Transportation Policies. 
 
To contextualize this trend, I assessed each word as a percentage of the total word count in each 
document, accounting for the fact that the Bush and Obama versions are more verbose than the 
Clinton document.  In the 1994 document, “private” makes up 0.45% of the word count, 
“commercial” makes up 0.11% of the word count, in the 2004 version, “private” makes up 
0.11% and “commercial” is 0.84% of the count, and finally, in 2013 “private” encompasses 
0.33% of the word count and “commercial” is 0.89%.  Looking at the percentage of the total 
indicates each word’s relative weight in its respective document, according to these findings, the 
word “private” carries the most weight in the 1994 version, with 2013 coming in second, and 
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2004 is last.  The word “commercial” carries more weight in the 2013 version, followed by 2004, 
and lastly, 1994.  This indicates emphasis has shifted away from the word “private” to the word 
“commercial” in the most recent editions, the implications of this verbiage shift cannot be 
accurately determined without first analyzing the content of each policy.   
The next analysis I did was a weight sum comparison of the content in all three versions 
of the NSTP.  The weight sum model is typically used as a decision making process, where 
different courses of action are compared based upon the assigned weights of different criteria.  
While this method does not entirely guarantee a positive or negative change in policy for the 
space launch industry, the subject criteria were picked based upon their favorable indication for 
that industry, indicating that the highest weighted outcome is the most favorable.  Using the 1994 
policy as a baseline, I established seven subject criteria that appear, and assigned each a weight 
between 0.0 and 1.0.  The seven criteria are as follows: government facilitation, ability to 
compete, access to U.S. Government assets (technologies, facilities, etc.), foster international 
competitiveness, involvement in space launch technology development efforts, appropriate 
regulation/restriction and proprietary rights.  Imagining the seven categories as a pyramid 
graphically depicts their importance, starting with the highest assigned values on the bottom, or 
those carrying the load:  
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Table 4  
 
Note. Pyramid of categories measure for the NSTP Weighted Sum Analysis.  
The highest valued is government facilitation, which is weighted at a 0.8.  Government 
facilitation is defined as encouragement, funding or investment from the U.S Government to 
enable the growth of the American space launch industry.  Government facilitation is the 
foundation of the pyramid because it is the one variable on which every other one depends.  
Without it, there would be no place for the private space launch at all.  What once was an 
exclusively federal program, ICBMs as launch vehicles, has shifted to commercial and private 
sectors.  Those industries would not exist without this language.  Also, with the government 
willing to apply funds for private technology development is crucial for these companies to 
become competitive.  Without the COTS contract awarded by NASA, SpaceX would not 
necessarily have been given the opportunity to flourish.     
Proprietary rights
Appropriate  
regulation/restriction
Involvment in space launch 
technology efforts
Foster international competativeness
Access to U.S government assets (technologies, facilities, 
etc.)
Ability to compete
U.S government facilitation
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Stepping up, the next category is ability to compete.  Ability to compete is the ease with 
which all companies have the ability to equally compete for government sponsored launches.  
This is important because the majority of launches out of the United States are sponsored by the 
government, meaning, if a private company wants to grow and profit, the ability to host these 
launches becomes crucial.  This is assigned a value of 0.7.  While it is not as foundational as 
government facilitation, it is essential for the growth of the private enterprise.     
 Access to U.S. Government assets is defined as the industry’s ability to access 
government resources to ensure the continuance of their endeavors; this was assigned a value of 
0.5.  While private spaceports are currently being built, SpaceX’s port in Brownsville, Texas, is 
an example, there are no operational sites yet.  Maintaining the ability to launch from the federal 
launch ranges allows private companies the ability to utilize existing facilities that are proven 
and tested.  Further, these companies can launch government sponsored payloads, which can 
only go from the federal ranges.  Launch ranges are not the only government resource, but shared 
technology is another beneficial resource, as private companies may take what they like and 
enhance their products.  
The next three topics are all assigned the same value 0.4, meaning that they are all 
deemed of similar importance and not as crucial as the foundational categories.  The first, 
fostering international competitiveness, is the explicit support of America’s ability to compete in 
the international commercial spacecraft market.  Allowing companies to expand their customer 
base beyond that of the United States opens the commercial marketplace.  Also, it allows for 
lower launch costs when able to compete against other, lower priced options than what private 
companies find in the United States.  It is a more accepting market for private companies trying 
to establish their customer bases instead of jumping straight into American competition.    
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Involvement in the space launch technology development efforts indicates that the 
opinion of the industry is valued, and that government agencies, especially NASA, have been 
directed to include industry experts in the development of America’s technology future.  This 
implies that private industry is meant to be incorporated into nominal U.S. space operations into 
the future.  It sets up a scenario where the expertise of the commercial enterprise will be heavily 
relied on and gives them a stake in the fight.  
  Appropriate regulation/restriction is how much flexibility the government is willing the 
industry to have in developing and executing their applications.  While safety is always the main 
focus, too much regulation stifles innovation, so this measure is to allow the industry the 
freedom to develop.  This is the government telling the private and commercial sector that they 
have the ability to engineer their technologies without fear of government encroachment, as long 
as they meet the appropriate level of safety criteria.   
Lastly, an issue that is always important to a profitable technology company, is the ability 
to maintain proprietary rights to their work.  Proprietary rights were assigned a criteria value of 
0.2.  This was assigned a lower value as this is not a necessity to develop a rocket, compete it 
and launch it.  While valued by private companies, it is not as necessary for the growth of a 
business or to physically launch the rocket.  Companies want to keep their edge and not have 
their sensitive information compromised.  This is another way for the government to state that 
companies can innovate their own way.  
After cataloging the content of each policy by its category, with some occurrences that fit 
and were placed into multiple categories, the occurrences were multiplied by their respective 
weights and a score was computed for each policy.  Ultimately, the scores came out to, 1994 
NSTP, 11.4; 2004 NSTP, 14.3; and 2013 NSTP, 22.7.  Again, by counting the number of 
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occurrences of each category, it does not guarantee a positive or negative outcome, but in 
picking the categories that would benefit the development of the industry, the increasing scores 
indicate a positive trend for the private space transportation industry.  Below is a table 
summarizing the results: 
Table 5 
 
Note. Weighted Sum Analysis: Measuring favorable policy outcomes for the private space 
launch industry.  
Of interest for present day private space transportation is the differential in the weighted scores, 
from 1994 to 2004, and then 2004 to 2013.  1994 to 2004’s difference is 2.9, but 2004 to 2013 
difference comes in at 8.4, which is almost triple the difference in policy change.  Overall, the 
weighted sum results indicate that there has been positive policy change, in favor of the private 
space launch industry, with the most significant change happening between the release of the 
2004 and 2013 versions of the National Space Transportation Policy. 
 The last analysis to capture the changes in within the policies is by referencing the 
existing literature on differences between the policies.  Jeff Foust, of SpaceNews.com indicates 
that most of the central tenets remain, either in the same or similar forms.  “These include 
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assured access to space; use of US vehicle to launch US government payloads, with certain 
exceptions; and support for commercial space transportation in the United States” (Foust, 2013).  
Differences identified by the author include a new emphasis on allowing new entrants to launch 
government payloads, whereas the 2004 policy had that the EELV program would “’shall be the 
foundation for access to space’” (Foust, 2013).  The new policy advocates for maintaining two 
U.S. space transportation families and does not mention EELV explicitly.  He also points out the 
following on new entrants: 
Both policies allowed for the introduction of new vehicles “’that demonstrate the ability 
to reliably launch’ such payloads, but the new policy specially mentions the use of 
‘established interagency new entrant certification criteria’ for such vehicles, and any 
changes to such criteria would have to be coordinated between the National Security 
Advisor and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Foust, 2013).   
This statement points to the shared responsibility that the national security sector and the 
commercial technology sector have to establish criteria for new entrants, meaning that national 
security does not exclusively own the process anymore, commercial industry now has a say.  
Another topic, not included as a category in the weighted sum study, due to the fact that it was a 
government initiative in 2004, was the concept of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), the 
ability to replenish and reconstitute government constellations in timely manner to address 
operational deficiencies in capability.  This topic was not included in the weighted sum study as 
it had not applicability to the private space launch sector, however, Foust contends that it now 
does, and the new policy wording reflects this.  The wording changed from “’the United States 
shall demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to 
support national security requirements,” to “directing the Secretary of Defense to work with 
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other agencies on ‘launch concepts, techniques, and technologies needed for augmentation or 
rapid restoration of national security space capabilities’” without being specific or using the term 
“operationally responsive space” (Foust, 2013).  Because (ORS) was a government initiative, not 
naming it outright or providing a deadline, the door is open for private space launch to develop 
that capability.   
Finally, and highly favorable toward current private space launch activities, is the 
inclusion of a provision not found in the 2004 policy to “’[c]ultivate increased technological 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the U.S commercial space transportation sector through the 
use of incentives such as nontraditional acquisition arrangements, competition, and prizes’ which 
mostly endorses current activities” (Foust, 2013).  
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CHAPTER 5 
SPACEX CASE STUDY 
To understand the value of changes to the National Space Transportation Policy, 
analyzing a real-world example provides the application to a private space transportation 
company that has advocated and used policy change to its advantage.    
Space Exploration Technologies is a startup American space launch company.  The 
construct of the space business has been one of big risk and big money, meaning that companies 
that make their money launching rockets operate at a much higher initial cost than almost any 
other startup business.  In the context of SpaceX, it took an already established businessman in 
Elon Musk and some inspired investors willing to take the risk of this new venture.  The 
following are the six objectives that frame their company: 
1) Build simple, reusable and inexpensive rockets for multiple journeys to space, carrying 
cargo to LEO; 2) Certify the Dragon Capsule to carry humans to the ISS under the NASA 
Commercial Crew Development Program to become a reliable US launch option; 3) 
Continue to increase business which decrease launch cost; 4) Build a commercial launch 
facility in Brownville, TX; 5) Make manned spaceflight commonplace and eventually 
take men to Mars; 6) To facilitate the travel of cargo and people to other planets, where 
there will be colonies ("About SpaceX," n.d.).
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These goals are extremely ambitious and take the diligence and intelligence of numerous 
employees and visionaries to make happen.  First, the work it will take to accomplish these goals 
is discussed, then how the most recent NSTP policy changes will aid in the company’s efforts.  
 In order to tackle the first initiative of building a simple, reusable and inexpensive rocket 
to LEO, they are attempting to combat a problem that has plagued the biggest and most 
successful launch providers: the increasingly inflated cost of a space launch.  As mentioned 
previously, the EELV program was initially intended to support itself via commercial payloads, a 
market which never materialized.  This, combined with significant regulation compared to 
overseas providers, meant EELV launch providers could not compete with the lower prices 
found elsewhere.  Furthermore, rockets are not simple, nor are they largely reusable.  Large 
rockets are constructed in multiple stages, and use a number of different types and combinations 
of fuels.  This also complicates making them highly reusable, as multiple components mean that 
multiple pieces must be recovered, or flown back, which adds complexity and risk. 
 The second goal of certifying the Dragon Capsule to carry humans to the ISS under the 
NASA Commercial Development Program is one that took a step back with the SpaceX launch 
explosion that occurred in July 2015 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL.  However, for a 
private company to delve into such a significant program such as spaceflight, the timing is now.  
In addition to favorable policy changes, world events have provided an opportunity.   Recently 
there has been an ongoing crisis in Ukraine where the Russian government invaded the Crimean 
province in supposed defense of “native Russians” threatened by the Ukrainian government in 
Kiev; it then annexed the entire province leading to worldwide tension with the West, especially 
the United States.  Multiple sanctions later, the fact that the Atlas V uses the Russian built RD-
180 engine coupled with America’s reliance on the Russian space program to carry astronauts to 
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and from space, at almost $70 million a head, means that the United States is looking for 
alternatives (Wall, 2013).  The United States is looking for alternatives to take Americans to 
space and to also carry national security payloads to space as the current supply of RD-180 
engines is limited.  SpaceX provides an alternative.   
 SpaceX seems to be having moderate success toward their third goal of continuing to 
increase business to decrease launch cost.  They currently have an extensive launch manifest that 
they keep on top of to avoid an incredible backlog, but still with staunch federal range safety 
regulations that they must abide by which increases their timeline and preparedness for each 
launch and introduces increased cost and delays their launch pace.  Also, because of the safety 
regulations, SpaceX has to invest more money into satisfying these demands.  Recently, a 
commercial satellite communications provider launched two back-to-back payloads from Cape 
Canaveral aboard SpaceX rockets.  The AsiaSat Company, based out of Hong Kong, were 
deploying their telecommunications satellites over parts of Asia and Australasia in the second 
half of 2014, AsiaSat 8 and AsiaSat 6 respectively.  The head of AsiaSat, Mr. William Wade 
commented on the drawbacks of launching at Cape Canaveral: 
‘I think Cape Canaveral is a great place to launch, but it does have its downside, which is 
it’s quite bureaucratic there.  There are a lot of regulations and clearances and 
restrictions, which I think hinders the processing of commercial satellites [there].  […] 
Even though our processing has gone well, it’s not been without some frustrations from 
the various teams just having to deal with the government […].  Unfortunately, I think 
that’s one of the reasons that SpaceX is looking at doing commercial launches on their 
own satellites base down in Texas’ (Clark, 2014).  
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Because SpaceX has not yet completed its Texas spaceport, it is still relegated to the federal 
launch ranges, which comes at an increased cost due to stringent safety requirements as well as 
an involved pre-launch process. 
  The fourth objective of SpaceX is to build a commercial launch facility in Texas.  The 
company broke ground on its launch site on the Gulf coast of Texas, in Brownsville, on 22 
September 2014 (Wall, 2014).  Constructing a private spaceport, the first of its kind in the United 
States, is significant in more than one way.  The first is that it will allow SpaceX the autonomy 
of operations, separate from military regulation, which it seeks for its commercial payloads.  It 
will allow SpaceX to charge decreased prices because they will not have the restrictive 
regulations to contend with, regulations that include conducting a certain number of rehearsals 
that utilize range and contractor personnel and cost substantial money.  The construction of this 
spaceport is also significant because the principle that it is setting for not only other private 
spacefarers, but also for the political ammunition that it implies.  As an example, Texas was 
eager to lure the creation of SpaceX’s launch facility to the Lone-Star state.  “Texas offered 
SpaceX about $15 million in incentives to build the spaceport within the state’s borders.  The 
facility should be operational by 2016” (Wall, 2014).  Likewise, Elon Musk will provide what 
the Texas government desires: for the spaceport to bring significant economic growth to the 
southern part of the state: “[w]ith today’s groundbreaking at Boca Chica Beach, we will begin an 
investment in South Texas that will create hundreds of jobs and, over time, contribute hundreds 
of millions of dollars into the local economy” (Wall, 2014).  This is an example of an economic 
incentive toward a local economy, one strategy employed by SpaceX. 
 The fifth goal of SpaceX is to make manned spaceflight commonplace and eventually 
take mankind to Mars.  SpaceX is making a big push recently to become the premier ride for 
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astronauts to space in the upgraded version of their Dragon capsule.  Right now, the Dragon is 
used for resupply mission to the ISS and back, but the real intent of the vessel is to become man 
rated and take astronauts to and from space.  SpaceX plans on using Dragon as a baseline for a 
Mars trip capable spacecraft in the future.  
 The company’s final stated goal is to facilitate the travel of cargo and people to other 
planets, where there will be colonies.  This is an ambitious pronouncement from this relatively 
and still unproved venture.  Following along with the theme of going to Mars, the overarching 
objective is to allow for the travel, literally, between worlds.  Mars and interplanetary travel are 
years, if not decades away and SpaceX still needs to further identify how they will achieve these 
admirable ambitions.   
 Attaining these goals are what propels SpaceX to strive for continued and even greater 
success in the different markets they are diving into.  In the context of the thesis question, it is in 
the company’s best interest to bring the commercial spacecraft market back to the United States 
from international competition.  SpaceX is able to bring that market to the U.S. based upon their 
leverage as a low-cost provider amongst the more expensive Atlas V and Delta IV.  The 
company was built upon Elon Musk’s dream of catering to the commercial spacecraft market.  
According to Musk’s biographer Ashlee Vance, Musk had dreams of going to Mars, and created 
his own Mars foundation—the Life to Mars Foundation, where he held a series of sessions in 
2001 discussing his “Mars Oasis” plan: 
Under this plan, Musk would buy a rocket and use it to shoot what amounted to a robotic 
greenhouse to Mars.  A group of researchers had already been working on a space-ready 
growth chamber for plants.  The idea was to modify their structure, so that it could open 
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briefly and such in some of the Martian regolith […] and then use it to grown a plan, 
which would in turn produce the first oxygen on Mars (Vance, 2015, p. 103). 
The biggest issue with the idea was the budget that Musk wanted to commit to it, between $20 
million and $30 million.  The rocket launch would eat the entirety of that budget and then some.  
Subsequently, Elon started looking at the Russians for an answer.  “He intended to buy a 
refurbished […] ICBM from the Russians and use that as his launch vehicle” (Vance, 2015, p. 
104).  The meetings that followed with Russian companies such as “NPO Lavochkin, which had 
made probes intended for Mars and Venus for the Russian Federal Space Agency, and 
Kosmotras, a commercial satellite launcher” (Vance, 2015, p. 106).  There were three meetings 
over four months and after much theater at the hand of the Russian businessmen, Elon asked 
point blank how much it would cost to buy the ICBMs.  The Russians countered with “8 million 
each.  Musk countered, offering $8 million for two” which was turned down (Vance, 2015, p. 
107).  Elon Musk left Russia more determined to see his project through.  On the plane ride 
home, he committed to the beginning of SpaceX.  “According to Musk’s calculations, he could 
undercut existing launch companies by building a modest-sized rocket that would cater to a part 
of the market that specialized in carrying smaller satellites and research payloads to space” 
(Vance 108).  The potential commercial market for space launch had been made possible by the 
existence of the ISS according to ex-NASA Administrator Dr. Michael Griffin:  
‘With the advent of the ISS, there will exist for the first time a strong, identifiable market 
for ‘routine’ transportation service to and from LEO, and that this will be only the first 
step in what will be a huge opportunity for truly commercial space enterprise.  We 
believe that when we engage the engine of competition, these services will be provided in 
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a more cost-effective fashion than when the government has to do it’ (Seedhouse, 2012, 
p. 88). 
Not only did Musk recognize America’s need for a reliable spacelift program that could bring 
commercial payload business back to the United States, but he saw a potential market for a 
private company to eventually carry national security payloads at a much reduced price and 
provide a domestic option to carry astronauts back into space with the end of the Space Shuttle 
program and NASA reliant on Russia.   
 SpaceX was created, in part, to cater to the commercial space market.  The company was 
founded in 2002 and has since achieved both setback and success.  SpaceX has always pitched 
itself as a low-cost solution to the inflated launch industry.  Its key to keeping its prices low is its 
beginning as a start-up and building its business away from the bureaucratic influence of 
government, unlike the EELV program, which was developed under the American government’s 
thumb, SpaceX developed as a private organization geared toward efficiency and profit.  SpaceX 
advertises that it can launch a Falcon 9 rocket to LEO for “an average of $57 million, which 
works out to less than $2,500 per pound to orbit” (Chaikin, 2012).  Which is a significant 
decrease from the current Atlas V rate to LEO, an average of $100 million according to ULA’s 
website ("Frequently Asked Questions - Launch Costs," 2015).  SpaceX’s approach to rocket 
design is to simplify it, and then reuse it.  They have proven their reusability technology in the 
form of their landing legs technology.  As part of this effort to reduce the cost of spacelift, they 
originated the concept of landing legs.  Landing legs provide the means to allow parts of the 
launch vehicle to return and land back where it took off—unheard of technology at the beginning 
of its development.  Landing legs allow the reuse of the most important part of the booster which 
will allow SpaceX savings by recycling and not creating every launch vehicle from scratch.  
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Also, it allows for a faster turnover time to launch more frequently and eliminates some latency 
in the launch timeline which improves costs.  Landing legs have recently become a proven 
technology with the landing of a returning Falcon 9 booster, both on barges at sea and back on 
the launch pad.  On 8 April 2016, after 5 attempts to land at sea, “the Falcon 9’s first stage 
performed several flyback engine burns, then eventually lowered itself vertically onto a SpaceX 
drone ship that was stationed off of the Florida coast” completing the first successful landing on 
a barge (Cofield, 2016).  On 21 December 2015, a Falcon 9 launched to deliver 11 commercial 
satellites to orbit, two-and-a-half minutes after liftoff, “the 14-story first stage dropped away and 
began the first of three engine burns sending it back toward a concrete pad at Space X’s 
‘Landing Complex 1’ at the Cape, he former Launch Complex 13” and successfully landing the 
booster back on the pad (Dean, 2015).  With SpaceX’s successful demonstration of landing legs, 
and returning their boosters to be reused, it allows them to maintain their low cost of launch.   
 As detailed in the Literature Review, the United States jumped from owning 23% of the 
world commercial launch market in 2013, to 50% of the market in 2014.  Digging down into the 
how those launches were distributed among American launch providers details that over the five-
year time period between 2010-2014, ULA only had two commercial launches between its two 
rocket families, one on an Atlas V and one on a Delta Heavy.  Space X’s Falcon 9, on the other 
hand, had thirteen total commercial launches and the number of SpaceX launches doubled from 
2013, when they had three launches, to 2014, when they had six (Commercial Space 
Transportation: 2013/2014 Year in Review, 2014/2015).  SpaceX made a huge leap in 2014 in 
securing launch contracts and brought the majority of the international commercial market back 
to the United States.  And their commercial launch contracts in subsequent years have continued 
to grow.  While the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation 2015 Year in Review is not yet 
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available, according to SpaceX’s website, they completed six launches in 2015.  Their launch 
price chart advertised a standard Falcon 9 ascent at $62 million, valuing their 2015 contracts at 
$372 million.  In 2016, they have completed six launches through 1 July 2016, valued at $372M, 
with forty-three more launches on their launch manifest valued at $2.83 billion ("Launch 
Manifest," 2016).  Looking at these launch contract figures and their values, it is clear that 
SpaceX belongs among the economic elite demographic as defined by Gilens and Page, which 
has enabled its founder to belong in the same category.  The benefit of belonging to the 
economic elite class means that both SpaceX and Elon Musk have resources at their disposal to 
influence political matters.   
 Elon Musk and SpaceX have used a variety of influence strategies to advocate in 
Washington, D.C.  In the 1980 study by Aplin and Hegarty, discussed in the literature review, 
there are four strategies of influence that influencers use on legislative members: “strategies 
based on information; strategies relying on public exposure and appeals; strategies employed 
employing direct power; and strategies depending on political pressure” (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, 
p. 444).  Identifying these four strategies, SpaceX has employed strategies based on information, 
relying of public exposure and appeals; and perhaps political pressure.  SpaceX uses lobbying 
just like many other companies, however, their expenditures on their efforts have increased since 
their first demonstration flight in 2010.  In 2010, their total lobbying expenditures totaled 
$568,958 and have increased steadily every year, in 2012 they topped $1 million, and in 2013, 
the year the new NSTP came out, they spent $1.12 million ("Space Exploration Technologies: 
Summary," 2016).  During the same time period, ULA spent significantly less, even though it 
started to ramp up its efforts in 2012, it still spent less than SpaceX.  In 2010, they spent 
$120,000; in 2012 when SpaceX topped $1 million, ULA spent $377,374.  Finally, in 2013 when 
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the new NSTP came out, ULA spent $671,881; almost half of what SpaceX spent during that 
same time period ("United Launch Alliance: Summary," 2015).  Orbital ATK, the developer of 
the Antares rocket, the other launch vehicle carrying ISS payloads for NASA, has also increased 
their lobbying efforts over the last few years.  In 2010, they spent $210,000; in 2012 they 
invested $355,000 in lobbying efforts; and in 2013 they spent $390,000.  While SpaceX led the 
group in funds spent, both ULA and Orbital ATK followed suit in 2014.  SpaceX spent $1.53 
million, ULA spent almost exactly $1.0 million, and Orbital ATK gave $1.64 million, 
outspending the other two companies ("United Launch Alliance: Summary," 2015) This is one 
strategy SpaceX used more aggressively in the year the 2013 National Space Transportation 
Policy dropped, which indicates increased advocacy and influence, a strategy of information.   
 Another strategy SpaceX uses is by donating to Political Action Committees (PACs), or 
to the campaigns of legislatures or political candidates.  While data is only available for every 
two years, SpaceX’s contributions have continually increased since 2010.  In 2010, they raised 
$65,829 and spent $77,945; in 2012 they raised $164,000 and spent $117,693; and in 2014 they 
raised $279,828 and spent $250,605 ("SpaceX: Summary," 2016).  I was not able to locate PAC 
contributions of ULA, but for Orbital ATK, their expenditures since 2010 have been consistent.  
In 2010, they raised $243,214 and spent $285,500; in 2012 the raised $222,262 and spent 
$232,750; and in 2014, they raised $226,561 and spent $281,888 ("Orbital Sciences Corp: 
Summary," 2016).  Around the NSTP change cycle in 2013, Orbital ATK and SpaceX were 
comparable in their PAC contributions.  Raising and spending financial resources on PACS is a 
form of the political pressure strategy.   
 In terms of a public exposure and appeals strategy, Elon Musk does a tremendous job of 
publicly marketing his company and its ideals.  Along with all his other businesses, which 
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include Tesla Motors and Solar City, he tirelessly advocates for his companies.  According to 
Neil Sheth, founder of a digital marketing agency, Elon Musk is a charismatic leader often 
compared to the Avengers character, Tony Stark.  His companies create technological 
innovations that attract the attention of worldwide media.  He also uses social media effectively, 
with 2.82 million Twitter followers, he is able to get his message out quickly.  He knows his 
audience and reaches out and his Twitter responses often lead a reaction to his Tesla stocks 
(Sheth, 2015).  Even though SpaceX is not yet publicly traded, one can assume that Musk’s 
words would have a similar effect.  Lawmakers pay attention to the publicity companies are 
getting as it allows them to determine if it provides a positive association.  While this is not a 
direct public exposure and appeals strategy, Musk’s public relations savvy can only help with 
SpaceX’s influence over political matters.  There is no quantitative measure here, just a 
common-sense association.   
 Lastly, a direct pressure strategy may be employed per the 1980 study.  SpaceX has not 
used a technique based on direct pressure.  SpaceX used three of the four influence strategies: 
strategies based on information, strategies relying on public exposure and appeal and strategies 
depending on political pressure.   
 One last question is whether SpaceX has benefitted from the 2013 National Space 
Transportation Policy?  One example directly harkens back to the new policy, which opened up 
competition to new entrants.  This quote from Jeff Foust’s article discussed earlier, but is the 
verbiage that allows for the example: 
Both policies allowed for the introduction of new vehicles “’that demonstrate the ability 
to reliably launch’ such payloads, but the new policy specially mentions the use of 
‘established interagency new entrant certification criteria’ for such vehicles, and any 
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changes to such criteria would have to be coordinated between the National Security 
Advisor and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Foust, 2013).   
 As competition opened up, in April 2014, Elon Musk announced that SpaceX was filing a 
lawsuit against the Air Force for the awarding of the sole-source block contract to ULA for 36 
launches over 5 years, awarded in 2013.  SpaceX was challenging the no-competition nature of 
the contract: “’[e]ssentially what we feel is that this is not right. That the national security 
launches should be put up for competition and they should not be awarded on a sole source, 
uncompeted basis,’ Musk said. SpaceX [was] asking that the contract be canceled and not 
awarded until its Falcon 9 rocket is certified by the Air Force and has a chance to grab some of 
the business” (Magnuson, 2014).  Although SpaceX filed this lawsuit to open competition, it was 
not the first time they filed a lawsuit against the Air Force.  
SpaceX filed its first lawsuit in 2006 after it was announced that Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin were entering into the joint-venture of ULA.  They filed an anti-trust lawsuit against the 
plan but it was ultimately dismissed, based on the fact that, at the time, SpaceX was not yet ready 
to compete for EELV class missions and therefore could not have been harmed by the merger.  
“Judge Florence-Marie Cooper of the District Court of the Central District of California heard 
the case […] and largely agreed with Boeing and Lockheed, citing that ‘injury must be real and 
immediate rather than conjectural or hypothetical’” (Gaskill, 2006).  SpaceX did not win this 
lawsuit, not only were they not yet an established launch providers, but the 2004 NSTP was still 
in effect that said: 
For the foreseeable future, the capabilities developed under the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle program shall be the foundation for access to space for intermediate and 
larger payloads for national security, homeland security, and civil purposes to the 
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maximum extent possible consistent with mission, performance, cost, and schedule 
requirements (National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-40, 2004). 
The verbiage of the Bush era policy did not help the young company.  It was only after the 
verbiage was changed in the 2013 version, and SpaceX established itself as a reliable launch 
provider, did a judge rule in their favor.  This is an applicable example of how SpaceX benefitted 
from the updated policy.   
 Because of the favorable changes to the 2013 NSTP for the private space transportation 
industry, SpaceX has directly benefitted as shown in the above example, and also in their 
ushering back the international commercial launch market to the United States, with the U.S. 
launching 50% of the world’s commercial satellites.  Their status as an economic elite allows 
their use of resources to advocate for their position and use their political strategies.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to answer the question: How does the distribution of commercial 
satellite payloads between different launch providers influence the National Space 
Transportation Policy?  To this end, I started big picture, establishing launch distribution among 
the world’s nations over the 2010-2014 time period, due to that being the most recent data 
available from the Space Foundation’s Space Report, as well as the FAA’s Commercial Space 
Transportation, Year in Review series.  After determining that the United States effectively 
regained the world’s commercial launch market in 2014, launch distribution among American 
launch providers was established, concluding that the private space launch company, SpaceX 
brought back the commercial launch market through their low launch price and successful 
launches.  After this, the question to answer was how does a private space transportation 
company turn its economic success into political influence.  Several different models were 
examined, to link the economic variable to political influence and in what ways this influences 
the launch manifest.  A 2014 Study by Gilens and Page, entitled: “Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” in which the Economic Elite theory 
proved to be an influential model.  Classifying SpaceX as an economic elite led to the theory that 
they have resources available at their disposal to influence policy makers.  These resources 
manifest as different strategies and those strategies used by SpaceX were examined.  Ultimately, 
what provided the crux of the research, to prove if there had been any change to the National 
Space Transportation Policy, through its three versions, 1994, 2004 and 2013, was a weighted
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 sum model that identified the most favorable policy toward a private space transportation 
company.  Also, the difference in verbiage proved to be a critical factor in allowing private 
enterprise to compete for what were exclusive contracts before.  Importantly, for this thesis 
project, the research questions below were addressed in the body of this paper. 
1) What is the picture of the world commercial payload industry over the last five years? 
2) Focusing in on the United States, what is the distribution of commercial payloads to 
different launch providers over the past five years? 
3) For any distribution trends observed, what is the reason for that trend? 
4) How do you translate launch distribution into an economic value? 
5) How do you translate economic value into political influence?   
6) How do you measure influence on a specific policy, the National Space Transportation 
Policy in this case? 
Suggested further research includes looking at how other business enterprises affect 
policies that govern them, if there is another similar industry that benefits or suffers as directly as 
the launch industry does from its policy.  The space transportation industry in evolving rapidly 
with the introduction of private enterprise.  An industry that has maintained a stasis for many 
years in now being challenged to grow and adapt, become flexible and answer to a more agile 
competitor.  The 2013 National Space Transportation Policy evolved in its guidance to allow for 
this very scenario, and the American space program will benefit.   
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